The better AI gets, the smaller its share of the economy might get – Alex Imas and Phil Trammell
Alex Imas (Director of AGI Economics at Google DeepMind, Professor of Economics at U Chicago) and Phil Trammell (head of Economics at Epoch, research scholar at Stanford) with Dwarkesh Patel. The throughline is the title's counter-intuitive thesis, and it cuts directly against this week's **$4T AI-IPO-wave euphoria**: the better AI gets, the *smaller* the AI/capital sector's share of the economy might become — a Baumol-effect argument that value accrues to what stays scarce, and the only durably scarce thing is **humans in the loop ('the relational sector')**. The mechanism: as automation drives the price of machine-made goods toward zero, demand for them satiates, and a constant or rising fraction of spending flows to the human-intrinsic services AI can't replace — which is exactly how, after two centuries of automation, **labour share has stayed 'over 60%'** and US prime-age employment sits at its highest since 2000. The load-bearing caveat for AI-company value capture is the compute counter-case: *'an H100 costs more to rent now than it did three years ago, even though we have much superior technology'* — *'because as models get smarter, the opportunity cost of compute gets higher'* — the one good whose demand may never satiate, which is the whole bull case for the labs. Imas's discipline note is that **the debate is data-free** (*'we need a Manhattan Project for data'* on demand elasticities), so the right move is scenario-mapping, not point forecasts. The most investable conclusion lands squarely on the IPO thread: the value-capture question reduces to whether AGI is **'like electricity or social media'** — a commoditised utility whose gains diffuse to users (you can't capture it, so *'just buy the index'*), or a platform that keeps the rents. Both economists *want* the labs commoditised — Imas because concentration makes the labs *'a very tangible, clear political target'* (he cites the Defense Production Act threat against Anthropic), Trammell flagging the one cost: commoditisation removes the safety buffer of a leader–laggard gap. The bear read on the entire **OpenAI/Anthropic IPO cohort**: the more transformative and broadly-adopted AI becomes, the harder it is for any single lab to keep the surplus — the same logic Mercor's CEO ran this week ('application-layer companies have no defensibility').
Key points
- **The title thesis is a value-capture warning, not a tech-skeptic one.** *'The only way this relational story works... is if it's not a human is not a horse, in the sense that it is providing value from the output where if you replace the human, the value of the output decreases'* (Imas). Better AI → machine goods get cheaper → demand satiates → a constant/rising share of spending routes to scarce human services. **Read against [Thomas Laffont's '$4T AI IPO wave' and Sarah Friar's OpenAI-IPO framing this week](/issues/2026-06-07), this is the structural bear case the supply wave isn't pricing: the sector capturing the GDP share may not be the sector going public.**
- **Labour share has refused to fall — the empirical anchor under the whole argument.** *'It's incredibly surprising that it's over 60% after the industrial revolution, after all of the automation we've ever seen... labor share hasn't even fallen ever'* (Imas, citing Andy Atkinson). And on the employment record: Ricardo *'would be surprised if you told him it the highest it's ever been other than 2000.'* **The base rate says automation reallocates rather than destroys the wage bill — a direct rebuttal to the white-collar-bloodbath narrative the IPO bulls and bears both lean on.**
- **The compute counter-case is the bulls' best card — and the economists name it.** *'An H100 costs more to rent now than it did three years ago, even though we have much superior technology and we have much more compute in the world. Because as models get smarter, the opportunity cost of compute gets higher'* (host setup; Imas reframes it as 'increasing variety'). **This is the one good whose demand may never satiate — the mechanism by which AI capital could keep a rising share, and the cleanest steelman of the [memory/compute cohort thesis carried from Issue 07](/issues/2026-05-31). If demand for compute satiates, the capex case breaks; if it doesn't, labour share falls. That fork is the trade.**
- **'Electricity or social media' is the single decision tree for the IPO cohort.** Imas asks *'is AI going to be like electricity or social media?'* — *'a lot of the downstream benefits actually came to like the users of the electricity'*, whereas *'with social media it was the opposite case... Everybody uses social media, but the rents went to the platform.'* **The more you believe the whole economy runs on AGI the way it runs on electricity, the more the gains diffuse and the less any single lab captures — which is why the actionable conclusion is 'just buy the index,' not buy the lab. This is the same defensibility doubt [Mercor's CEO raised this week ('application-layer companies have no defensibility, token spend exceeds salaries')](/issues/2026-06-07), pushed up the stack to the labs themselves.**
- **Both economists actively *want* the labs commoditised — a notable stance into the IPO window.** The hope is voiced explicitly: *'that the labs do get commoditized or at the very least they go public as soon as possible'*, because *'it is as hard to capture the gains of AI as it is to capture the gains of electrification'* — broad prosperity, not concentrated rents. **For an investor reading the OpenAI/Anthropic S1s, the takeaway is uncomfortable: the social-welfare-optimal outcome (commoditisation) is the one that craters lab equity value. The bull thesis requires the labs to *fail* at the thing these economists hope they fail at.**
- **The bear-on-concentration argument: scarcity creates a political target.** *'It creates a very tangible, clear political target for the government'* — *'we saw this with the Defense Production act threat against anthropic. If there wasn't one lab that is, or a couple of labs that are clearly ahead of others, this kind of threat would be much harder to make'* (Imas). **A regulatory-tail risk the IPO cohort underweights: being the clear frontier leader is precisely what invites a state intervention that a commoditised field would never face — the inverse of the moat thesis.**
- **The safety cost of commoditisation — the one cut against the 'buy the index' optimism.** *'One big cost of having commoditized frontier AI models, which is the tech race dynamic, that for safety purposes, you might want fewer frontier companies so that each one has a buffer in case they want to slow things down to make things safer'* (Trammell). But he resolves it: *'you could just have a relatively big gap, but it's a public company ownership and it's widely distributed.'* **You don't have to choose between safety and broad gains — a directional answer to the concentration-vs-diffusion debate running through the whole AI-bubble cohort.**
- **The data vacuum is the real story — every confident AI-economics call is currently unfalsifiable.** *'If you don't take anything out of this conversation for me, we don't have any data. I've been kind of saying we need a Manhattan Project for data. We don't have data on basically consumer demand elasticities'* (Imas). The right tool is scenario-mapping each branch to the scarcity that would produce it. **A calibration check for the entire ROI-reckoning thread [from Issue 07](/issues/2026-05-31): the bull and bear ARR/margin arguments are being made on data that, by these economists' account, doesn't exist yet.**
- **Supply-chain automation, not the ballerina, is where capital share actually flips.** *'there will be at least some goods whose network adjusted capital share goes to one, because the whole supply chain can be automated and there's no part in it that we care intrinsically about having a human do'* (Trammell) — yet *'the implications of that shift for the overall capital share are ambiguous'*, because newly-abundant goods satiate and their marginal utility collapses faster than quantity rises. **The investable nuance: the right unit of analysis is network-adjusted factor share down the whole supply chain, not the visible final step — which is why headline 'AI replaces job X' stories systematically mis-estimate where value lands. Pairs with [Lenny's 'most rational take on AI' this week](/issues/2026-06-07) as the cohort's anti-hype anchor.**
Notable quotes
Something like the relational sector, which is what I defined as basically services and goods, where the fact that the human was in the loop was actually part of the value of that product. And so because humans are naturally scarce, if we have automation, where a lot of other things stop being scarce, we will still have scarcity in things that humans are kind of involved in and in the loop for.
If you don't take anything out of this conversation for me, we don't have any data. I've been kind of saying we need a Manhattan Project for data. We don't have data on basically consumer demand elasticities. We don't know what they are.
It's incredibly surprising that it's over 60% after the industrial revolution, after all of the automation we've ever seen... Andy Atkinson has this paper showing that actually if you keep the accounting concep distant over the years, labor share hasn't even fallen ever.
The famous fact here is that an H100 costs more to rent now than it did three years ago, even though we have much superior technology and we have much more compute in the world. Because as models get smarter, the opportunity cost of compute gets higher.
If that increasing variety is fast enough, and there is no such increasing variety in the human sector, then you can get all of the relational that you want. But it doesn't matter for labor share, it goes to zero.
A lot of the downstream benefits actually came to like the users of the electricity rather than the, rather than the actual entity producing the electricity. On the other hand, with social media it was the opposite case. Right? Social media, you know, it was everywhere. Everybody uses social media, but the rents went to the platform.
So I think there is a world where it is concentrated in which case it's going to be really hard to index AGI. There is another world where it is not. It's electricity. Then like basically every company has access to AGI. So you just buy, you just buy the index.
One big cost of having commoditized frontier AI models, which is the tech race dynamic, that for safety purposes, you might want fewer frontier companies so that each one has a buffer in case they want to slow things down to make things safer.
Themes
- AI value capture & the relational sector
- Labour share / Baumol satiation
- Compute non-satiation (the bull hinge)
- Model commoditisation: electricity vs platform
- Index-the-economy vs own-the-lab
Mentioned
People
Ideas
- the relational sector
- labour share stays >60%
- Baumol effect / satiation of machine goods
- Manhattan Project for data
- H100 rent rising / compute non-satiation
- electricity vs social-media value capture
- just buy the index of AGI
- model commoditisation as the bull-or-bear hinge
- messy-middle scenario
- network-adjusted factor shares
- Defense Production Act threat / concentration as political target
- safety buffer vs commoditisation trade-off